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Small shifts in choice occur even without discussion, when individuals 
merely know each other’s preference. This appears to support an interpersonal 
comparison explanation of group induced shifts in choice and to refuteexplana- 
tions based on persuasive argumentation. The present study demonstrates the 
contrary, that such effects are consistent with the persuasive-arguments formula- 
tion and are obtained under particular conditions specified only by the latter 
theory, to wit: Knowledge of other’s choices is assumed to lead a person to think 
of reasons (arguments) others might have had for their choices-reasons which 
ordinarily would not come to mind without this knowledge. Such reasoning func- 
tions in the same way as persuasive argumentation during group discussion; it 
causes the person to persuade himself that an alternative course of action now has 
greater merit than the one he initially preferred. To test this analysis, an experi- 
ment was performed in which subjects responded to choice-dilemma items under 
three different conditions: Following their own choice (I) they learned what sev- 
eral others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given 
in that same item; (II) they learned what several others had chosen and then 
wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in a different item; and (III) they 
received no information about others’ choices but merely wrote arguments on 
that item. As predicted, shifts in choice occurred only if the person knew what 
others chose and had an opportunity to think about the latter (condition I); they 
did not occur if an opportunity to think of others’ choices was denied (condition 
II), nor if knowledge of others’ choices was withheld (condition III). Content 
analysis of the arguments subjects produced in conditions I and II completely 
supported the hypothesis. as did analyses of responses to postexperimental ques- 
tionnaire which directly asked the subjects about their feelings and thoughts upon 
learning what others had chosen. 
This study is one of a series having to do with, among other things, 
the relative impact of informational (or cognitive) versus normative (or 
motivational) processes on the position an individual takes following 
group discussion. That this is a fundamental problem in the analysis of 
social influence was recognized at the very beginning of research on 
behavior in groups. Over 35 yr ago Thorndike (1938a) stressed the point 
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that discrepancies between the initial opinions and those held following 
group discussion may be due either (a) “. . . merely to knowing the 
opinion of the other members of the group, and shifting to conform to 
it . . .” or (b) “. . . to the intellectual give-and-take of discus- 
sion . . . ” -a distinction Deutsch and Gerard (1955) later reempha- 
sized in their influential paper. In the present experiment we try to spec- 
ify how in the absence of normative incentives (say, a desire to avoid the 
chagrin of disagreement), knowledge of where others stand on an issue 
can by itself sway a person. More specifically, an attempt is made to 
demonstrate that the manner in which one thinks or, if you will, argues 
to himself, about an issue and thus the attitude or preference he sub- 
sequently expresses can be guided by such knowledge. 
The experimental paradigm for studying group effects on individual 
preferences has been relatively invariant: initial opinions are compared 
with those held following discussion (or with the group decision). At the 
same time a motley assortment of items has been served up for discus- 
sion. In addition to the widely used Choice-Dilemma Questionnaire 
involving the selection of a probability level (Kogan & Wallach, 1964, 
Appendix E), revisions in preference have been studied using a wide 
variety of attitudinal items (Doise, 1969; Gouge & Fraser, 1972; Mos- 
covici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Bishop, 1970, 1971), as well as diverse 
problems of fact or logic (Barnlund, 1950; Hall, Mouton, & Blake, 1963; 
Lorge & Solomon, 1955; Thomas & Fink, 1961; Thorndike, 193ga, 
1938b). Myers & Lamm (in press) have thoroughly reviewed this mam- 
moth literature. 
Unfortunately the discussion effect has been labeled differently de- 
pending on the kind of item used. It is perhaps for this reason that there 
has been a failure to recognize that these shifts in prefer- 
ences-regardless of the item-are fundamentally similar, tokens of the 
same type, reflecting a general and pervasive consequence of social dis- 
course (see a model which describes the common underlying process in 
Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974). So in more benighted times, changes in 
probability preferences following discussion were dubbed “risky” or 
“cautious” shifts. When it dawned that these shifts had little to do with 
risk or caution, the neutral phrase “choice-shift” was suggested (Pruitt, 
1971a. b) and a French researcher, more prudent to begin with, merely 
said “extremization” (Lambert, 1969, 1971). Changes on standard atti- 
tude scales were tagged as cases of “polarization” (Moscovici & Zaval- 
loni, 1969). Finally,, those prosaic scholars who compared individual pre- 
and postdiscussion solutions to assorted logical and factual problems 
simply recorded whether the shift was toward a superior or inferior 
choice (see reviews by Kelley & Thibaut, 1969; Steiner, 1972). 
Because our purpose is to observe what a person thinks when he 
knows the preference of others and how such thinking affects his own 
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preference, it is unfortunate that the overwhelming number of studies on 
opinion change focuses on the external or situational determinants (e.g., 
properties of the source, the message, etc.). Assumptions about internal 
processes are not often subject to direct examination. For example, con- 
sidering the variety of standard techniques available it is disconcerting 
that so few researchers have attempted to determine if in fact dissonance 
is a noxious drive state (some exceptions being Cottrell & Wack, 1967; 
Suedfeld & Epstein, 1971; Waterman & Katkin, 1967). Nevertheless, a 
more direct scrutiny of private events is recognized as a feasible and 
fruitful undertaking (Gerard & Connolley, 1972; McGuire, 1972) of 
which there already exist several interesting exemplars (see Brock, 1967; 
Burdick & Burnes, 1958; Gerard, 196.5; Gormly, Gormly, & Johnson, 
1972; Greenwald, 1968; Keating & Brock, 1974; Steiner, 1966). 
The general approach of Brock (1967) and Greenwald (1968) is particu- 
larly relevant here. Puzzles by the weak relationship between the extent 
to which a message is learned and its persuasive impact, Greenwald con- 
jectured that opinion change directly depends on the arguments elicited 
in the recipient by the message and not so much on those contained in 
the latter. Hence, independent of the ability to recall what a source ad- 
vocates, opinion change might be minimal if the target person was not 
stimulated to think of cogent propositions beyond those contained in the 
influence attempt; and a boomerang effect could well occur if he hap- 
pened to imagine novel counterarguments. This line of reasoning quite 
naturally led to an assessment of argumentative thinking, one which 
provided considerable support for Greenwald’s hypothesis. 
Our investigation of group induced shifts in preference has come to a 
similar point. At present there exist two general explanations for these 
shifts. One asserts that they are due to interpersonal comparison or nor- 
mative processes and the other believes that persuasive argumentation 
or informational processes are critical (see the extensive reviews by 
Cartwright, 1971; Pruitt, 1971a, b; and Vinokur, 1971; as well as studies 
by Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973; Burnstein, Vinokur, & Trope, 1973). In- 
terpersonal comparison has it that moderate choices have emotional 
consequences which make them less stable than extreme choices. Con- 
sider the Brown (1965) analysis. He says such preferences reflect the 
person’s allegiance to widely held cultural values; individuals who find 
by comparison that they are relatively moderate are distressed by the 
implication of moderation, which is, inadequate adherence to cherished 
standards of conduct, and to display proper adherence they shift toward 
a more extreme position. The ideas people present to support or to 
derogate a particular position are explicitly rejected as neither necessary 
nor sufficient to produce such changes. Persuasive-arguments theory, on 
the other hand, asserts that knowledge of others’ choices has no direct 
consequences for subsequent revisions in choice. Shifts occur because 
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during discussion individuals are exposed to persuasive arguments pro- 
viding information not available to them prior to making their initial 
choice. 
In testing these two classes of theories we have found considerable 
support for persuasive-arguments and little or none for interpersonal 
comparison (see Burnstein, Vinokur, & Trope, 1973; Burnstein, Vin- 
okur, & Pichevin, 1974; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974). For instance, in 
an experiment varying knowledge of others’ choices independent of 
argumentation, a reliable main effect was obtained only for the latter. In 
other words, shifts in choice increased with increasing argumentation; 
but increasing information about what others had chosen had no general 
effect (Burnstein, Vinokur, & Trope, 1973). 
While the overall results bode poorly for theories stressing normative 
processes, internal analysis suggested that individuals with the greatest 
knowledge about others’ choices did tend to revise their initial position 
in the predicted direction, albeit relatively infrequently. Moreover, a few 
earlier studies have succeeded in producing similar attenuated shifts 
when only knowledge of others’ choices was provided (e.g., Clark & 
Willems, 1969; Teger & Pruitt, 1967), although several others were not 
so successful (e.g., Clark, et al., 1971; St. Jean, 1970; Wallach & Kogan, 
1965). On the face of it the effect is a puzzle for the persuasive- 
arguments explanation. How could it be possible for shifts to occur 
when only the choices of others are known-in the absence of argumen- 
tation? To resolve the matter, we speculated as follows: 
. . knowledge that others’ choices are discrepant from his own may induce 
the person to reconstruct a line of reasoning which he thinks could have produced 
such choices. That is to say, knowing others have chosen differently stimulates 
the person to generate arguments which could explain (and thus would support) 
their choices. Therefore, according to our conjecture, informing the person that 
others took a position more extreme than his own does not serve so much to 
threaten his self-esteem or to legitimize some suppressed yearning but rather in- 
duces him to find a reasonable explanation for the difference (Burnstein, Vinokur, 
& Trope, 1973, p. 244). 
The present experiment tests this speculation. Briefly, it consists of 
three conditions: (I) Individuals learn one another’s preferences on a 
specific decision task and immediately afterward generate arguments in 
support of each of the alternatives involved in that same task; (II) 
individuals learn one another’s preferences on a specific decision-task and 
immediately afterward generate arguments in support of each of the 
alternatives involved in a different task; and (III) individuals know only 
their own preference on a specific decision-task, they do not know the 
preference of others, and generate arguments in support of each of the 
alternatives involved in that same task. If knowledge of the others’ choices 
produces a revision in the person’s own preference indirectly, that is, only 
when such knowledge induces the person to think of arguments explaining 
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the others’ choices, then a few important effects should be observed. First, 
shifts in choices will be obtained in Condition I but not in Conditions II and 
III. In the latter situations the person is prevented from thinking in 
appropriate fashion, from generating relevant arguments, either because 
of the nature of the activities he must perform immediately upon being 
informed of the others’ choices (in Condition II) or because he simply does 
not know what the others have chosen (in Condition III). Secondly, if 
knowledge of others’ choices induces the person to think of reasons why 
such a course of action might be preferred, then the person will generate 
more arguments in support of alternatives suggested by the positions of 
others in Condition I than in Condition III (obviously, only in the former 
condition can his arguments be informed by what others have chosen). In 
general this means if individuals shift to a more risky (or cautious) course 
of action, then we should observe that immediately preceding the shift they 
will have thought of a greater number of arguments in favor of risk (or 
caution) than those who do not shift. 
On learning others’ preferences, no doubt some subjects will find their 
choice rather risky and some will find their choice rather cautious. Since in 
the present study only decisions which shift toward risk will be used, we do 
not expect the initially more risky subjects to shift toward caution. The 
reason for this is straightforward, although perhaps not totally obvious: 
Elsewhere it has been shown (Ebbesen & Bowers, 1974; Silverthorne, 
1971; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974; Vinokur, Trope, $ Burnstein, 1975) 
that on decisions which shift toward risk following discussion there are 
fewer arguments available in favor of the cautious alternative and those 
available are less cogent than arguments which come to mind in favor of the 
risky alternative (the converse being true for decisions known to shift 
toward caution). Recall our hypothesis states that shifts in choice are due 
to the arguments a person generates to himself upon learning others have 
chosen differently. If this is true, then subjects who are quite risky and 
thereby find others are relatively cautious will be able to think of only a few 
rather unpersuasive arguments in favor of the cautious alternative; on the 
other hand individuals who are cautious and find others are relatively risky 
should be capable of coming up with many persuasive arguments in 
support of the risky course. Therefore, the latter are likely to revise their 
initial choice but the former are not. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
A total of 60 male students from the introductory courses in psychology at the University of 
Michigan participated in this experiment as part of their course requirement. They were run in 
12 S-man groups. 
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Materials 
A set of three choice dilemma items were chosen from the standard Choice Dilemma 
Questionnaire (CDQ). These have been found to yield robust shifts toward risk (items 4, 6, 
and 7, Kogan and Wallach, 1964, Appendix E). 
Each choice-dilemma was accompanied by the standard instructions to choose-between 
odds of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, in IO-the lowest odds of success acceptable in order to 
recommend trying the uncertain alternative; or, instead, to indicate that this alternative 
should not be attempted, no matter what the odds. In the latter case, a response is usually 
scored as 10. Risk is measured as the odds that are chosen by the subject. 
The three items were preceded by the standard instructions and a practice item and 
assembled in a booklet entitled “Opinion Questionnaire.” 
In addition to the “Opinion Questionnaire” each subject received two more booklets in 
the course of the experiment. The first booklet entitled “Consideration Booklet” con- 
tained several pages on which pro-risk and pro-caution considerations (arguments) are to 
be listed by the subjects. At the top of each page a five-category rating scale was given. 
This defined for the subject how he should go about assigning weights to the arguments, 
ranging from “No Weight” (i.e., 0) to “Extreme Weight” (i.e., 4). The rest of the page 
was divided by horizontal lines into four boxes. In the margin of each box a small space 
was provided to indicate the weight given to the consideration in the box, and underneath, 
the instruction to “Circle L or H” appeared. Subjects were informed to circle the letter 
“L” of “H” if the consideration they have listed in the box is basically in support of a 
rather low probability (i.e.. pro-risk) or a rather high probability (i.e., pro-caution), respec- 
tively. 
The second booklet entitled “Final Questionnaire” contained instructions and fresh 
copies of the three items from the “Opinion Questionnaire.” 
Postexperimental questionnaire: In this questionnaire subjects were asked to: 
Please try to recall those IWO choice-items immediately following which each person in 
the group announced the probability level he had selected. These were items Al and B. 
Below you will make certain judgments about how you felt and what you thought while 
working on these two items. At times you may not be certain about your feelings and 
thoughts. This is to be expected. We would just like you to make the best judgment you 
can, given what you can recall. 
In making this judgment you will evaluate each situation-when you worked on item A 
and when you worked on item 3-separately but an the same rating scale. This is done by 
placing the letter denoting the item at that point on the rating scale which most closely cor- 
responds to how you felt or what you thought while working on the item. 
Several statements were then provided for evaluation: each with a 7-point rating scale. 
The poles were defined as completely true-completely untrue or very much-not at all, 
whichever was applicable. The statements included: 
I. My initial choice was rather different from the initial choices most others made. 
2. That there was some difference between my initial choice and the initial choices of 
others made absolutely no difference to me, i.e., I didn’t react at aII. 
3. 1 was disturbed by this difference. 
4. I was surprised by this difference. 
5. I was curious about this difference. 
6. I wondered why the others made the choice they did-what they had in mind. 
7. I thought of the reasons the others might have had for making their choices. 
‘The items belonging to the three conditions were alternated from session to session. 
The actual letters were properly inserted in the questionnaire before each session. 
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8. I thought of the reasons for making my own choice. 
9. Some new considerations came to mind which I had not thought of earlier. 
Procedure and Instructions 
Subjects arriving at the laboratory were seated at small tables in a half circle facing a 
blackboard and were asked to fill out the “Opinion Questionnaire.” After all subjects 
completed the questionnaire the experimenter distributed the “Consideration Booklet” 
and asked the subjects to read the cover page which included an explanation of how to list 
the arguments in the booklet and how to rate them. He then went over the explanation 
giving hypothetical examples to make sure that all the subjects are clear about the task. 
Then the “Final Questionnaire” was handed over to the subjects and they were asked to 
read the following instructions on the cover page: 
“In this study we are investigating various conditions that help people in arriving at 
better decisions. For that reason we will have different procedures in each of the following 
stages of the experiment and we ask you to follow our instructions carefully.” 
The experimenter proceeded then with the experimental manipulations which corre- 
sponded to the three conditions. Each manipulation involved a separate choice dilemma 
item. The order of the items was alternated over the experimental sessions. 
The first manipulation always consisted of condition III where subjects are not exposed 
to the choices of the other members and consequently are not engaged in comparison 
processes. The experimenter asked them to turn to the second item in the “Opinion Ques- 
tionnaire” (the first is a practice item) and read the following instructions: 
“Now we would like you to reconsider this choice-dilemma again. By thinking it 
through again you may discover additional relevant considerations. If  you do fmd some 
new ones, please list these additional considerations in the “Consideration Booklet.” Rate 
each consideration as to how much weight it carries and circle the letter L or H. You are 
given 4 min to complete the listing and rating of the new considerations. Only new consid- 
erations which had not been considered before should be listed. There is no limit on how 
few or how many should be listed: all depends on how many come to mind.” 
At the end of 4 min the experimenter called for the subjects’ attention and read the fol- 
lowing instructions: 
“Possibly by reconsidering the situation again after having seen it before, you may have 
a better idea of the kind of decision that you would like to make. 
We would like you now to make your final decision on the choice-dilemma in the “Final 
Questionnaire.” Please do not feel bound by what you marked before on the practice 
booklet. Whether or not you change, or how much you change is not important. What is 
important is that you reconsider your answer carefully.” 
After subjects checked their final decision (only 15 set were allowed) the experimenter 
proceeded with the next two manipulations which corresponded to conditions I and II. 
Their order was alternated over the sessions. 
In condition II the experimenter asked the subjects to turn to the third item of their 
“Opinion Questionnaire” and each in turn to read their choice aloud from the question- 
naire. These choices were written on the blackboard facing the subjects, and were thus 
freely and continuously available for inspection. Immediately thereafter subjects were 
asked to turn to theJirst (i.e., practice) item in their “Opinion Questionnaire.” The experi- 
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siderations that come to their mind while reexamining this first item. At the end of 4 min 
the subjects were asked to turn back to the third item in the “Final Questionnaire” (i.e.. 
same item on which their initial choices are still written on the blackboard) and again the 
experimenter read the above quoted instructions requesting they make their final choices 
on that item within the next 15 sec. When they were done, the experimenter erased the 
blackboard. 
In condition I, the critical condition, subjects were asked to turn to thefourrh item on their 
“Opinion Questionnaire”; they then read their initial choices to the experimenter and he 
wrote these on the blackboard. From that point on the experimenter repeated the procedure 
used for the manipulation in condition III. The experimental design is outlined in Table 1. 
Following the last manipulation the subjects were asked to fill out the post experimental 
questionnaire. When all the questionnaires were completed the purpose of the study was 
explained and discussed with the subjects. 
RESULTS 
Shifts 
The first analysis compared mean shifts in the three conditions. The 
results are presented in Table 2. 
As hypothesized, the critical manipulation which both (1) exposed 
each subject to the choices of all others and (2) provided him the oppor- 
tunity to produce relevant arguments (condition I) yielded substantial 
and statistically significant shifts toward risk (x = -.65; p < .OOl>. The 
other manipulations, either exposing subjects to the choices of others 
while precluding relevant argumentative thought (condition II) OY 
providing him with the opportunity of argumentative thinking while 
withholding information about others’ choices (condition III) did not 
yield reliable shifts. 
A one-way analysis of variance with three repeated measures was per- 
formed on the shift scores, that is, on the difference between subject’s 
choice before and after the three experimental manipulations. This analy- 
sis yielded a statistically significantF ratio (F(2,22) = 9.70;~ < .OOl). On 
the basis of the above analysis we examined two orthogonal a priori con- 
trasts: (1) whether the shifts in conditions II and III are different and (2) 
TABLE 2 
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND t VALUE FOR SHIFTS IN CHOICE 
Conditions Mean shift” SD t* P 
I -.6.5 0.33 -6.60 ,001 
II .18 0.39 1.57 ns 
III .02 0.62 .09 ns 
(1 The values denote odds in 10. Negative value denotes shifts toward greater risk, i.e., 
lower probability. 
b All tests are correlated two-tail t tests based on n = 12 (i.e., groups). 
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whether the shifts in condition I are different than the shifts in condition 
II and III combined. 
For the first contrast, the analysis yielded a statistically nonsignificant 
F ratio (F( 1,22) < 1) indicating that the mean shifts in conditions II and 
III do not differ. For the second contrast, the analysis yielded a statis- 
tically significant F ratio (F(1,22) = 18.66; p < .OOl) demonstrating that 
the mean shift in our critical condition (I) is reliably greater than those in 
the other conditions (II and III). 
Balance of Arguments 
Note that in the past, descriptions of the informational processes as- 
sumed to cause shifts in choice focused on the actual argumentation 
taking place during group discussion. This experiment, however, deals 
with the effects of internal argumentation stimulated by knowledge of 
others’ choice. The concern here is with self-persuasion. Specifically, it 
is hypothesized that the shifts demonstrated in condition I are the result 
of arguments that come to mind through exposure to the positions of 
others. In addition to demonstrating that the opportunity to think about 
what others chose leads to shifts, our hypothesis requires that the con- 
tent of these thoughts be analyzed. To this end, the number of pro-risk 
and pro-caution arguments were summed separately for each subject, as 
were the weights given to these arguments. The mean total weight and 
mean number of pro-risk and pro-caution arguments are presented in 
Table 3. 
As predicted, in condition I the number of pro-risk arguments as well 
as their weight is significantly larger than the number and the weight of 
the pro-caution arguments (JJ < .05). This effect does not obtain in condi- 
tion III. Moreover, although, the number and the weight of pro-caution 
TABLE 3 
MEAN TOTAL WEIGHT, MEAN NUMBER OF PRO-RISK AND PRO-CAUTION 
ARGUMENTS, AND MEAN BALANCE OF ARGUMENTS 
Pro-caution Balance of 
Pro-risk arguments arguments arguments 
(1) (2) (2)-(l) 
Conditions Weight Number Weight Number Weight Number 
I 4.03 1.45 2.73 0.98 - 1.30* -0.47* 
III 3.10 1.08 2.71 0.92 -0.38 -0.17 
I-III 0.93* 0.37** 0.02 0.06 -.92 -.30 
Note: AlI tests are two-tail correlated t tests based on n = 12 (i.e., Groups), 
* p < .os. 
** p < .Ol. 
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arguments are about the same in both conditions, the number and the 
weight of pro-risk arguments are significantly larger in condition I than 
in condition III @ < .Ol and p < .05, respectively). 
Finally, if the shifts in condition I are indeed the result of argumenta- 
tive thinking, then they should correlate with the balance of weighted 
pro-risk to weighted pro-caution arguments across subjects. The product 
moment correlation between shifts and the balance of weighted argu- 
ments was thus computed for condition I as well as for condition III. A 
correlation of .30 was obtained for condition I, statistically significant at 
the .05 level, and a correlation of .12 for condition III, statistically insig- 
nificant. This is a rather important finding, demonstrating that relevant 
arguments which are triggered by exposure to others’ choices do in fact 
mediate shifts in choice. 
Responses to the postexperimental questionnaire. First, it is interest- 
ing to observe that in condition I subjects who deny that the difference 
between their own initial choice and the choices of others made no dif- 
ference for them (Q. 2)-implying it did-tended to be disturbed (Q. 3) 
and curious (Q. 5) about the difference (r = .41; p < .Ol; r = .31; 
p < .05, respectively), and to wonder about the reasons others might 
have had for making their choice (Q. 7: r = .40, p < .Ol). Note that 
these subjects did not become concerned and think of the reasons for 
making their own choices (Q. 8: r = O.OO), which suggests that exposure 
to others’ CDQ choices does not make one defensive about his own 
position. Rather, it stimulates curiosity and leads the person to consider 
why others chose the way they did. 
Consistent with the above results we found also that subjects who 
thought of the reasons the others might have had for their choices (Q. 7) 
and who indicated that new considerations came to mind (Q. 9) pro- 
duced a greater number of, as well as more cogent (i.e., given greater 
weight) pro-risk arguments (r = .25 and .28, respectively; p < .05 for 
both). Finally subjects who thought about reasons others might have had 
for their choices (Q. 7) indeed tended to shift toward greater risk 
(r = .28, p < .05). 
DISCUSSION 
Persuasive-arguments theory asserts that knowledge of others’ 
choices is neither necessary nor sufficient for the occurrence of shifts in 
preference. Rather, shifts are due to the sharing of arguments for a par- 
ticular course of action during group discussion, arguments which were 
only partially available to members prior to said discussion (see a more 
detailed presentation in Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973; and especially in 
Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974). Although past research lends considerably 
greater support to this point of view than to those based on interpersonal 
comparison processes, there did exist a few embarrassing studies-ones 
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in which knowledge of others’ choices alone seemed to produce shifts, 
albeit attenuated ones. To handle this kind of effect it was conjectured 
that information about what others have chosen stimulates the person to 
generate a line of reasoning or argumentation which would explain why 
these people chose as they did. This means that knowledge about others’ 
preferences can be a sufficient condition for revising preferences to the 
extent that it leads one to think of arguments in support of the courses of 
action others have selected, arguments which previously had not come 
to mind. The present study strongly supports this conjecture. Shifts in 
choice occurred in the absence of group discussion only when individu- 
als knew and thought about what others had chosen. Moreover, the ex- 
tent to which they thought of reasons for others’ choices determined the 
extent to which they revised their own choice. 
Perhaps equally important, the individual is aware of his feelings and 
thoughts prior to the shift and this state of mind closely corresponds to 
that which would be expected on the basis of persuasive-arguments 
theory. Thus, the person was puzzled about the difference between his 
own and others’ preferences, and mulled over the reasons for the latter 
(not reasons supporting his own position). Indeed, the more the person 
reports thinking of why others chose as they did the more he shifts 
toward their choice. 
In the face of these findings as well as those from other recent studies 
(e.g., Burnstein, Vinokur, & Trope, 1973; Burnstein, Vinokur, & Pich- 
evin, 1974; Myers & Lamm, in press; St. Jean, 1970, 1973) it becomes 
increasingly difficult to believe that the emotional consequences of inter- 
personal comparison-embarassment, loss in self-esteem, etc.-play 
much if any role in choice-shift or polarization phenomena. Instead it may 
be more useful to view such revisions of opinion as the result of intra- 
and interpersonal information processing similar to that which takes place 
in group or individual problem solving and in attitude change. And knowl- 
edge that others have different preferences-engaging in interpersonal 
comparisons -may be one condition for stimulating this kind of thinking. 
That is to say, when choosing, the person weighs what he knows about 
the alternatives at hand (the relative importance of reasons or arguments 
for selecting one over the others, etc.), then, based on this knowledge, 
he makes some inferences about their relative value, and eventually, he 
chooses the alternative which appears most desirable, proper, or cor- 
rect. Analogously, when a group decides among (or merely discusses) 
these alternatives, in essence it infers relative desirability, propriety, or 
correctness by jointly evaluating the arguments in its possession. Thus, 
discussion leads each individual to reweigh his old reasons for selecting 
a particular course and to consider new reasons others have introduced, 
which process is often followed by a revision in choice. 
More specifically, our findings demonstrate that the reweighing of old 
424 BURNSTEIN AND VINOKUR 
arguments and the introducing of new ones also may be occasioned by 
others indirectly, to the extent that a person is induced to generate new 
arguments explaining (and thus supporting) their choices. It may be con- 
jectured, as does Greenwald (1968), that creating and reweighing argu- 
ments perhaps constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
revisions of opinion and choice. If so, effort should now go toward dis- 
covering the nature of such argumentation. 
REFERENCES 
Barnlund, D. C. A comparative study of individual, majority, and group judgment. Journa/ 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, 58, 55-60. 
Brock, T. C. Communication discrepancy and intent to persuade as determinants of coun- 
terargument production. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1967,3, 296-309. 
Brown, R. Social psychology. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965. 
Burdick, H. A. & Burnes, A. J. A test of “strain toward symmetry” theories. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1958, 57, 367-369. 
Bumstein, E. & Vinokur, A. Testing two classes of theories about group induced shifts in 
individual choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9, 123-137. 
Burnstein, E., Vinokur, A., & Trope, Y. Interpersonal comparison versus persuasive 
argumentation: A more direct test of alternative explanations for group induced shifts 
in individual choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9, 236-245. 
Bumstein, E., Vinokur, A., & Pichevin, M. F. What do differences between own, ad- 
mired, and attributed choices have to do with group induced shifts in choice? Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 1974, 10, 428-443. 
Cartwright, D. Risk taking by individuals and groups: an assessment of research employing 
choice dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 20, 361-378. 
Clark, R. D. & Willems, E. P. Where is the risky shift. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1969, 13, 215-221. 
Clark. R. D., Crockett, W. H., & Archer, R. L. Risk as value hypothesis: The relationship 
between perception of self, others and the risky shift. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 1971, 20, 425429. 
Cottrell, N. B. & Wack, D. L. Energizing effects of cognitive dissonance upon dominant 
and subordinate responses. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 
132-138. 
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. G. A study of informational social influences upon individual 
judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1965, 51, 629-636. 
Doise, W. Intergroup relations and polarization of individual and collective judgments. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 12, 136-143. 
Ebbesen, E. B. & Bowers, R. J. Proportion of risky to conservative arguments in a group 
discussion and choice shift. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 29, 
316-327. 
Gerard, H. B. Deviation, conformity, and commitment. In I. D. Steiner and J. Fishbein 
(Eds.), Current studies in social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1965. Pp. 263-277. 
Gerard, H. B. & Connolley, E. S. Conformity. In C. G. McClintock (Ed.), Experimental 
social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1972. Pp. 237-263. 
Gormly, J., Gormly, A., & Johnson, C. Consistency of sociobehavioral responses to inter- 
personal disagreement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 24, 
221-224. 
PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS AND CHOICE SHIFTS 425 
Gouge, C. & Fraser, C. A further demonstration of group polarization. European Journal 
of Social Psychology, 1972, 2, 95-97. 
Greenwald, A. G. Cognitive learning, cognitive response to persuasion, and attitude 
change. In A. G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock & T. M. Ostrom (Eds.), Psychologicalfoun- 
dations of attitudes. New York: Academic Press, 1968. 
Hall, E., Mouton, J., & Blake, R. Group problem solving effectiveness under conditions of 
pooling vs. interaction. Journal of Social Psychology, 1963, 59, 147-157. 
Keating, J. P. & Brock, T. C. Acceptance of persuasion and the inhibition of coun- 
terargumentation under various distraction tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psy- 
chology, 1974, 10, 301-309. 
Kelley, H. H. & Thibaut, J. W. Group problem solving. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 
(Eds.), Handbook of social psychology, Vol. IV (2nd ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Ad- 
dison-Wesley, 1969. 
Kogan, N. & Wallach, M. A. Risk taking: A study in cognition and personality. New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964. 
Lambert, R. Extremisation du comportement de prise de risque en groupe et modele 
majoritaire. Psychologie Francaise, 1969, 14, 113-125. 
Lambert, R. Extremisation due risque en groupe. Journal de la Societe de Statistique de 
Paris, 1971, 112, 11-22. 
Lorge, I. & Solomon, H. Two models of group behavior in the solution of eureka-type 
problems. Psychometrika, 1955, 20, 139-148. 
McGuire, W. J. Attitude change: the information processing paradigm. In C. G. McClin- 
tack (Ed.), Experimental social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1972. Pp. 108-141. 
Moscovici, S. & Zavalloni, M. The group as a polarizer of attitudes. Journal of Personahry 
and Social Psychology, 1969, 12, 125-135. 
Myers, D. G. & Bishop, G. D. Discussion effects on racial attitudes. Science, 1970, 169, 
778-779. 
Myers, D. G. & Bishop, G. D. Enhancement of dominant attitudes in group discussion. 
Journa! ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 1971, 20, 386-391. 
Myers, D. G. & Lamm, H. The group polarization phenomenon. Psychological Bulletin, 
in press. 
Pruitt, D. G. Choice shifts in group discussion: An introductory review. Journal of Person- 
ality and Social Psychology, 1971, 20, 339-360. (a) 
Pruitt, D. G. Conclusions: toward an understanding of choice shifts in group discussion. 
Journal of Personality and So&at Psychology, 197 1, 20,495-510. @) 
Silverthome, C. P. Informational input and the group shift phenomenon in risk taking. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 20, 456-461. 
Steiner. I. D. Personality and the resolution of interpersonal disagreements. In B. Maher 
(Ed.), Progress in experimental personality research. Vol. 3. New York: Academic 
Press. 1966. Pp. 165-239. 
Steiner, I. D. Group process and productivity. New York: Academic Press, 1972. 
St. Jean, R. Reformulation of the value hypothesis in group risk taking. Proceedings of the 
78th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 1970, 5, 
339-340. 
St. Jean, R. Relevant arguments, group membership, and the shift to risk. Unpublished 
manuscript, University of Prince Edward Island. 1973. 
Suedfeld, P. & Epstein, Y. M. Where is the “D” in dissonance? Journal of Personality, 
197],39, 178-188. 
Teger, A. I. & Pruitt, D. G. Components of group risk taking. Journ& of Experiment& 
Social Psychology, 1967, 3, 189-205. 
Thomas, E. J. & Fink, C. F. Models of group problem solving. Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 53-63. 
426 BURNSTEIN AND VINOKUR 
Thorndike, R. L. The effect of discussion upon the correctness of group decisions, when 
the factor of majority is allowed for. Journal of Social Psychology, 1938, 9, 
343-362. (a) 
Thomdike, R. L. On what type of task will a group do well? Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 1938, 33, 4Ow13. (b) 
Vinokur, A. Review and theoretical analysis of the effects of group processes upon indi- 
vidual and group decisions involving risk. Psychologicnl Bulletin, 1971, 76, 231-250. 
Vinokur, A. & Bumstein, E. The effects of partially shared persuasive arguments on group 
induced shifts: A group problem solving approach. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1974, 29, 305-315. 
Vinokur, A., Trope, Y., & Bumstein, E. A decision making analysis of persuasive argu- 
mentation and the choice-shift effect. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
1975, 11, 127-148. 
Wallach, M. A. & Kogan, N. The roles of information, discussion and consensus in group 
risk taking. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 1-19. 
Waterman, C. K. & Katkin, E. S. Energizing (dynamogenic) effect of cognitive dissonance 
on task performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 126-131. 
(Received May 8, 1974) 
